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Abstract. Web parameter injection attacks are common and powerful.
In this kind of attacks, malicious attackers can employ HTTP requests
to implement attacks against servers by injecting some malicious codes
into the parameters of the HTTP requests. Against the web parameter
injection attacks, most of the existing Web Intrusion Detection Systems
(WIDS) cannot find unknown new attacks and have a high false posi-
tive rate (FPR), since they lack the ability of re-learning and rarely pay
attention to the intrinsic relationship between the characters. In this pa-
per, we propose a malicious requests detection system with re-learning
ability based on an improved convolution neural network (CNN) model.
We add a character-level embedding layer before the convolution layer,
which makes our model able to learn the intrinsic relationship between
the characters of the query string. Further, we modify the filters of CNN
and the modified filters can extract the fine-grained features of the query
string. The test results demonstrate that our model has lower FPR com-
pared with support vector machine (SVM) and random forest (RF).
Keywords: Malicious Detection · Injection Attacks · CNN · Embedding
· Deep Learning.
1 Introduction
By HTTP/HTTPS, a user client can initiate a web request and send it to the
web server. A web request usually carries some parameters input by users. Fig. 1
shows the query string in GET method which is one of HTTP methods. Many
attackers use this part to pass their malicious code to the web server.
Web application attacks are common in attack incidents against web servers.
According to the recent report of Alert Logic [3,2], 73% of the attack incidents
in the past 18 months are web application attacks and these attacks affected
85% of its customers. Akamai(a Content Delivery Network service provider)
also published that hackers had launched 47,417,828 web attacks aiming at Aka-
mai servers in just 8 days, between November 8, 2017 to November 15, 2017 [4].
Within all web attacks, code injection attacks account for a large proportion. By
injecting some malicious codes into the parameters of the HTTP requests, ma-
licious attackers can employ HTTP requests to accomplish their attacks against
servers. This type of attacks is called as parameter injection attacks. Thus, it
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GET http://localhost:8080/Index.jsp?param1=v1&param2=v2&param3=v3 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Konqueror/3.5; Linux) KHTML/3.5.8 (like Gecko)
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-control: no-cache
Accept: text/xml,application/xml
Accept-Encoding: x-gzip, x-deflate, gzip, deflate
Accept-Charset: utf-8, utf-8;q=0.5, *;q=0.5
Accept-Language: en
Host: localhost:8080
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F563B5262843F12ECAE41815ABDEEA54
Connection: close
query string
Fig. 1. a request parameter in an HTTP header
is necessary for service providers to build an efficient mechanism to detect code
injection attacks.
Against web parameter injection attacks, the existing method is Web Intru-
sion Detection Systems(WIDS), which includes signature-based detection and
anomaly-based detection [17]. With signature-based detection, the server needs
to maintain a library of malicious symbols that distinguish an injection attack
from normal web requests. When it receives a request, the server searches the
query string to see if they contain a malicious symbol, and a web request con-
taining a malicious symbol is considered as an attack. This signature-based de-
tection usually performs very well on the known attacks that contain distinct
symbols. However, a tiny change on the injected codes will hide the symbols and
disable this method. Obviously, signature-based detection cannot find unknown
new attacks. As for anomaly-based detection, the server needs to train a math
model which can characterize normal web requests and filter most abnormal web
requests. Compared with signature-based detection, this type of WIDS is able
to discover some unknown new attacks. Unfortunately, the FPR (false positive
rate) of anomaly-based detection is high in practice.
Besides the high FPR, the model of anomaly-based detection lacks the ability
of re-learning since it is a constant model. In fact, earlier anomaly-based detec-
tion system collects all training data once and then generates a constant model.
Earlier anomaly-based detection systems take the sample with abnormal data
structures as an attack. Thus, it can detect some unknown attacks. However,
when the data structure of an attack is similar with a normal one, an anomaly-
based detection system is incapable of finding the attack. The reason is that an
anomaly-based WIDS cannot update its model in time.
In this paper, by using CNN we build a model for detecting parameter in-
jection attacks in terms of web applications. In our model, we add a character-
embedding layer before the convolutional layers. The parameters within a request
is first fed into the character-embedding layer, and the character-embedding layer
transforms them into feature vectors which are then put into a traditional CNN
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along with their labels. The output of CNN is a prediction demonstrating if the
request is a malicious attack or not. The point is that our system is dynamic
and has the ability of re-learning. That is, the model can be restored when there
is some new data. Our system not only is able to find unknown new attacks, but
also is able to extract features of the malicious query automatically instead of
maintaining a feature library like the signature-based detection. Since our model
can extract both normal features and malicious features, it has lower FPR than
anomaly-based detection model which only learns normal features.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
We build an improved CNN model in order to detect malicious web requests.
In this model, we add a character-level embedding layer before the convolution
layer aiming to digitize a character sequence. Different from the normal digitiza-
tion, character-level embedding is able to learn the hidden character similarity
in web request. In the convolution layer, considering the one-dimensional data
structure, we design vertical filters to extract features from character sequence.
Based on the improved CNN model, we present an online learning system
which has re-learning ability. That is, the model can be updated in time when
there are some unknown new attacks. Therefore, it can adapt to the changing
attack methods.
2 Related work
2.1 Malicious request detection
Malicious request detection has been an active research area, and various ma-
licious request detection systems have been proposed. They provide solutions
for specific type or multiple types of malicious request. For example, refer-
ence [9,14,16] show us their solution to SQLI attack that is one of the most com-
mon malicious requests. Reference [14,16] train a Support Vector Machine(SVM)
model to detect SQLI attacks. Joshi and Geetha [9] detect SQLI attacks using
the Naive Bayes machine learning algorithm. Reference [9,14] create feature vec-
tor of string by the tokens of sql-query strings and feeds these vectors into the
SVM-Train process to generate a model. Uwagbole and Buchanan [16] create fea-
ture vectors by a hashing procedure called Feature hashing. But these method
of creating feature vectors cannot reflect the relationship between words. On the
other hand, the model of these paper is a constant model that is hard to be
updated when there are some new form of SQLI attacks. Dong and Zhang [7]
proposed an adaptive system based on SVM for detecting malicious queries in
web attacks. This system focused on 4 most frequent types of web-based code-
injection attacks. The model of this system can be updated by some new queries
periodically. But it does not pay attention to the local features which have an
important impact on the final detection result.
2.2 Convolutional neural network
In recent years, neural networks(NNs) have been successfully applied in many
areas. To some extent, malicious web request detection is a special kind of text
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classification problem. NNs have achieved great success in text classification area.
For example, Kim [10] applied CNNs to sentence classification and Shibahara
et al. [15] applied CNNs to url sequence which is similar to parameter string
focused in this paper. Kim [10] proposed a special CNNs named TextCNN.
TextCNN converts word sequence to a matrix which CNNs are able to process
through embedding layer. Shibahara et al. [15] proposed an Event De-noising
CNN(EDCNN). The input of EDCNN is more than just url sequence. They
use one-hot representation to denote the categorical features which contain city
corresponding to the IP address, TLD and country corresponding to the IP ad-
dress. In conclusion, CNN performs very well in these text classification problem,
therefore it is possible to solve the malicious web request detection problem using
CNN.
3 Proposed system
users` client malicious samples
system background
manual check
5.web response
1.web request
4.detection result
2.unknown
request
detection
model
3.classify
data preprocessing
update
model
update
database
labeled database
train
training model
web server detection system
Fig. 2. System Overview
In this section, we will present the proposed system detecting malicious web
request and give its details.
3.1 System design
Our system receives the parameters of the web request as input and outputs the
detection results. As shown in Fig. 2, the system includes five modules which
are data preprocessing, classification model, manual check, labeled database and
training model.
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Before we run our system, we need some labeled samples and use them to
train an initial detection model. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the system works as
follows:
1) A user client sends a web request with some parameters to the web server.
2) The web server passes the request to the data preprocessing module. The
data preprocessing module extracts the request parameter from the request
and converts it into a index list by indexing these characters.
3) The data preprocessing module feeds this index list into the detection model.
4) After some sophisticated computations with respect to this vector, the de-
tection model returns the detection result to the web server.
5) The web server responds to the user client according to the detection result.
If it is a benign request, the web server will return a web response that it
wants. Otherwise, the web server will return an error.
In the system background, the classification model saves some samples and
their detection results. These saved samples are randomly selected from those
samples that the detection model is less confident about (has relatively low
probability). In order to ensure that the labeled data is representative and the
amount of each type of data is balanced, we should check the samples manually
before adding them into the labeled database. When the system finds that the
labeled database has changed, it will train a new detection model based on the
old model by using the changed database. Then, system updates its detection
model with the new model. By this way, the model can get the re-learning ability
and adapt to the change of web attacks.
In this system, the detection task is mainly completed by the detection model.
The details of the detection model will be given in the next subsection.
3.2 Detection Model
Aiming to analyze web query string, we build an improved CNN model. Using
character embedding, we make the model learn by itself to digitalize characters
according to its tasks. Then, the improved CNN extracts the features of query
string and gives the detection results on the output layer.
Character representation A request parameter is a character sequence which
contains three types of characters, letters, digitals and special characters, which
are illustrated in Fig. 3. There are 95 characters totally. We convert character
sequences into index lists by indexing these characters. However, the character
index cannot reflect the relationship between the characters in a specific context.
For example, the character ‘=’ is not associated with the character ‘&’ in normal
texts. As shown in Fig. 4, in the context of web query string, they play the
similar role which is a separater. This similarity connot be represented by index
numbers.
In terms of this problem,we use character-level embedding in our model to
learn the hidden similarity between characters in web query string. The idea of
character-level embedding comes from the word embedding used in NLP [6].
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Lowercase letters a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z 
Uppercase letter A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
Digital 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9                 
Special characters ; ,   : / = % & @ ! * ( ) { } [ ] > < ? ‘ \ . _ | + 
- ` “ # $ ~ ^                    
 
Fig. 3. Characters List
key-value pair
key1=value1&key2=value2&key3=value3
key-value pair key-value pair
separate key-value pairs
separate key and value
Fig. 4. the character ‘=’ and ‘&’ in a request parameter
Model Architecture The model architecture, shown in Fig. 5, is a deep neu-
ral network we used in our demo system. It mainly consists of four parts: the
embedding layer, the convolution layer, the pooling layer and the output layer.
Embedding layer: The embedding layer converts a index list into digital
matrix and then feeds it into the convolution layer. Let ei ∈ Rk be the k-
dimensional vector corresponding to the i-th character in the character list.
Here, i denotes the index of a character. Then, we get an embedding table
E =
(
e0, e1, e2, ..., e94
)T
, from which we can query every character vector by
the character index. The embedding table is randomly initialized before starting
training and will be optimized by backpropagation to minimize the classification
error. As shown in Fig. 6, for a character in the character sequence, we look up in
the embedding table E and get a vector ei using the index of the character, thus
making a matrix X =
(
x0, x1, x2, ..., xn−1
)T
for the whole character sequence,
where xTi ∈ E. At the beginning of training, xi is randomly generated. After
several iterations, xi will be replaced by a new x
∗
i which has been optimized by
the backpropagation algorithm. If there are some internal relationships between
the character ca and the character cb in the request parameter, the Euclidean
distance between x∗a and x
∗
b will be smaller relatively. For example, in the exper-
iment we found the Euclidean distance between ‘=’ and ‘&’ (L2(x
∗
4, x
∗
10) = 7.8)
is smaller than the distance between ‘a’ and ‘&’ (L2(x
∗
6, x
∗
10) = 10.09), and in
practice ‘=’ and ‘&’ play the similar role.
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Fig. 5. Model architecture
Convolution layer: The convolution layer uses different filters to extract dif-
ferent feature vectors. The filters are some matrices with different sizes. But these
matrices must have k columns, where k is the column of E in Embedding layer.
It should be noted that the difference in size only lays in rows. Unlike CNN ap-
plied in image recognition, the filters in our model can only be moved vertically.
Because we want our CNN model to learn the relationship between characters,
and every row of the matrix X represents one character. In our model, we set
the width of filters equal to that of matrix X to ensure the indivisibility of each
character. Let y be one of the output feature vectors and F be a filter. Then the
output feature vector y is computed as:
yi = Relu(
L−1∑
r=0
k−1∑
c=0
Fr,cXi+r,c)
where yi denotes i-th value and F has L rows and k columns. Relu(Rectified
Linear Units) function is a popular activation function in the field of deep learn-
ing, which is proposed and applied in reference [11]. When we use n different
filters F , we will get n feature vectors y in convolution layer and these vectors
may have different lengths.
Pooling layer: Pooling is a commonly used method in the field of deep learn-
ing. Pooling layer outputs n results, where n denotes the amount of filters in
convolution layer. In our system, we use max pooling to calculate the outputs.
The output is derived as zi = max06t6l−1(yit), where l denotes the length of
feature vector y in convolution layer. This pooling layer is used to reduce the
amount of parameters and the computation in our network and hence to control
overfitting.
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Fig. 6. convert a character sequence to a matrix X
Output layer: The output layer outputs the classification results. The length
of the output vector is the number of the classes. The output vector is computed
as yj = Softmax(
∑n−1
i=0 wi,jzi), where n denotes the length of the output vector
of previous layer, w denotes weights of this layer and the function Softmax is
computed as Softmax(xj) =
exj∑
i e
xi
. In order to improve the generalization
ability of our model, we can also add dropout regularization in this layer. If we
use dropout in this layer, zi we get from the previous layer has a 50% probability
of being zero. The summation of all output values of this layer is 1 and the output
values are all non-negative. Therefore, an output value represents the probability
of belonging to a specific class.
To sum up, the embedding table, the filter matrices and the weights of every
layer are what we need to train, and they will be optimized by backpropagation
algorithm to minimize classification error.
4 Test and Evaluation
4.1 Dataset
In our experiment, we build our dataset through crawling from internet or ex-
tracting the data we need from other datasets [1,8]. Then we merge them into
one dataset. There are 5 types of data samples we chose in our dataset: Benign
request, SQL injection(SQLI), Remote File Inclusion(RFI), Cross-Site Script-
ing(XSS) and Directory Traversal(DT). However, the amount of each category
is extremely unbalanced. In order to keep the relative balance between each cat-
egory, we set a threshold for the amount of each category. When the number of
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Table 1. Composition of dataset
Category Number of samples Proportion
Benign request 2000 46.49%
SQLi 472 10.97%
XSS 720 16.74%
RFI 599 13.92%
DT 511 11.88%
SUM 4302 100%
samples in one category is greater than this threshold, we will randomly sample
this category to limit the number of samples to this threshold. Table 1 displays
the composition of the dataset we use finally.
4.2 Test Environment
We implement our architecture in Python 3.5.3 using Tensorflow [5]. The oper-
ating system we use is Ubuntu 17.04. We also use some of Python’s third-party
libraries, scikit-learn [13] and numpy.
Table 2. Performance of each model
Model Indicators Benign request DT RFI SQLi XSS FPR
RF
recall 99.62% 99.99% 99.58% 99.99% 99.65%
0.38%
precision 99.99% 98.58% 99.57% 99.53% 100%
SVM
recall 99.87% 99.53% 98.25% 98.52% 99.99%
0.13%
precision 99.12% 99.53% 99.98% 99.53% 100%
CNN
recall 99.95% 100% 100% 100% 100%
0.02%
precision 100% 100% 99.83%% 99.79% 100%
4.3 Evaluation
We implement a demo classifier for malicious requests detection using the model
shown in Fig. 5. In the training process, we shuffle all training samples and
divide them into several batches. Then the samples of each batch are used to
optimize embedding table and weights of every layer. The process that we use one
batch of samples to optimize these parameters is one step. So we can optimize
these parameters by all batches step by step. Fig. 7 shows how our model is
optimized step by step and demonstrates the sum of softmax cross entropy and
L2 regularization [12].
In order to compare with the traditional model, we add two control group.
We chose Random Forest(RF) and SVM as the control group. The model of
control group converts character sequences into sparse matrix through TF-IDF
algorithm. We calculate precision and recall rate [18] for every category and we
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Fig. 7. Train process
also calculate FPR (we choose malicious samples as positive samples) for each
model. So for one model we have one FPR and 5 pairs of precision and recall
rate to calculate. The results of our model against other two models are listed
in Table 2. Our model distinctively reduces FPR from 0.38% in RF and 0.13%
in SVM to 0.02%. We attribute this to the character-level embedding layer and
the modified filters of CNN. It should be noted that the limited improvement
in the recall and precision rate of our model is due to the limitations of the
dataset. Therefore, there is reason to believe that better results will be achieved
when comes to practical issues. Because only one convolution layer is used in
our demo system and more advanced features will be easily extracted if we use
more convolution layers.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a malicious requests detection system with re-learning ability based
on an improved CNN model. Compared with two other traditional model: SVM
and RF, our model pays more attention to the extraction of the local feature
in the query string. Specifically, we add a character-level embedding layer and
modify the filters of CNN to extract the local feature in the query string. The
results show that our improved CNN model outperforms traditional models on
test datasets, while the performance in more practical applications remains to
be tested.
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